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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary American living can be summarized in one word; isolation.  For the past 
three quarters of a century, American policy coupled with technological advances has created a 
landscape that has minimized interaction between the American citizenry while severely 
diminishing any sense of community.  Current urban development more closely resembles a 
cluster of Aegean islands than tightly knit communities contributing to the synergies of city life.  
To acquire any of life basic necessities, urban dwellers must depart from their island homes and 
navigate an automobile through a sea of identical island homes and lifeless buildings.  During his 
voyage, the dweller will observe that only automobile vessels are capable of withstanding the 
harsh and brutal outside world.  Like his home, the destination is also an independent, self-
contained area.  The destined outlet consists of parking spaces surrounding a square building, 
offering no indication that it but one component of a greater urban environment.  This bleak 
landscape pervades the American city and has created general condition of detachment which 
isolates the citizenry from any identifiable place. 
 One may easily attribute our condition of isolation to contemporary urban planning and 
find that its distressing effects are readily identifiable.  A society that isolates neighbors from one 
another fosters a sense of numbness within its citizens.  This loss of connection creates a 
spiritless community or what this paper will refer to as a loss of “civic life.”  Civic life is a 
reference to the interdependent relationships citizens have in the context of organized society.1  
The idea behind civic life is that it begets the “common good.”  Relationships amongst citizens 
form synergies that make the whole (the community) greater than the sum of its individual parts 
                                                 
1 See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE 38 (1996). 
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(its citizens).2 As James Howard Kunstler indicated, “a vital relationship [exists] between the 
character of our surroundings and the common good, that rights and responsibilities need a civic 
setting in which to dwell, and that such a setting is an identical setting of our lives, an actual 
place that must be worth caring about.”3  The zealous American pursuit of rugged individualism, 
as embodied in our urban structure, has effectively paralyzed the interdependent relationships 
necessary to establish a community.  Simply stated, American cities or suburbs are not worth 
caring about.  An area consisting of cookie cutter housing tracts, endless strip malls, and drab 
office parks instills little civic pride in its citizenry because they convey the citizenry and its 
surrounding community are meaningless.4   Instead, the citizenry recognizes their environment 
for what it is: a series of cookie cutter buildings centered around the automobile; not people. 
 A loss of civic life may very well be too abstract a concept for which an average person 
would develop much concern.  It is the root of many of the issues that are seemingly too 
peripheral and attenuated for the nation to focus.5  However, the loss of civic life and its isolation 
derivative are vividly manifesting their unavoidable consequences within the elderly population.  
Urban America isolates no other segment of the population so visibly.  In addition, no other 
segment so clearly unveils the inefficiency and unsustainability of the physical make-up of 
American society.  This paper will begin by discussing he inadequacies of our urban landscape in 
the context of the elderly population.  Then it will discuss how our current property tax system 
and American jurisprudence’s failure to recognize “givings” has perpetuated the inefficient 
design of our cities.  Finally, it proposes that a land value taxation system will remedy many of 
the social ills which exist under property taxation.    
                                                 
2 See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 52. 
3 See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 52. 
4 See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 39. 
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THE ELDERLY SITUATION 
 
A.  The Elderly’s Effect on General Society 
The uniqueness of the elderly population is that they profoundly affect the society around 
them.  As the elderly grow older they increasingly drain society’s resources without contributing 
much productivity in return.  On an individual level, typical middle-aged persons must provide 
more monitoring and support for their aging parents.  One may observe children are even more 
helpless and unproductive and require much greater attention.  The difference is that children, at 
least, hold the potential of becoming increasingly more productive as they grow older.  Children 
are an investment for the future.  Society expects children to reach their full potential in 
adulthood and to care for those seniors that cared for them in their youth.  In contrast, senior 
participation in the community does not consist of physical productivity, but rather, lends itself 
to the spirituality of the community.   Senior involvement validates the life cycle process in the 
context of community and signifies that each point of that cycle is integral to existence of the 
community.  Elderly community involvement is “essential to preserving the continuity and the 
vitality of American culture.”6  However, in consumer laden America where the only relevant 
issue is the bottom-line, any unprofitable segment of society quickly becomes forgotten.7 
 Despite middle-aged America’s inclinations, senior citizens are increasing becoming a 
harder segment to ignore.  Here are some statistics that demonstrate the large proportion of our 
population for which the elderly population accounts.  Currently, one in eight Americans is age 
sixty-five or above.8   The baby-boom generation will begin to enter retirement in 2008, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Voters view issues such as class stratification, crime, de facto segregation, and contamination as having causes 
different from urban structure. 
6 See David J. Allor, Re-Planning the Future: Community Life in Retirement, Planners Web, Planning 
Commissioners Journal 
7 Although I do recognize that seniors have tremendous political power. 
8 Deborah A. Howe, Creating Vital Communities: Planning for Our Aging Society, Planners Web, Planning 
Commissioners Journal. 
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will account for thirty percent of the population being fifty-five years or older by 2020.9  Ages 
eighty-five and older is the fastest growing age group and forty-eight percent of which requires 
functional assistance in daily living.10  Fourteen percent of seniors between the ages of sixty-five 
and seventy-four require such assistance.11  Clearly, the enormous size of the elderly population 
will compete as a major player for the resources society has at its disposal. 
 Even more alarming than the sheer size of the elderly population is the rapidly increasing 
proportion residing within suburbia.12   In 1980, of those sixty-five and older, thirty-nine percent 
lived in the suburbs; an increase of twenty-six percent from 1960.13  While the elderly currently 
may be able to financially support themselves within the isolation of their suburban homes, such 
a living arrangement is quickly becoming untenable.  The costs of retirement are steadily 
increasing.14  Specifically, home and health maintenance costs and property taxes are outpacing 
retirement incomes. Seniors will be unable to rely on government assistance due to the recent 
proposals to cut social service budgets on the federal, state, and local level.15  In addition, the 
pool of taxpayers paying into such programs diminishes as more and more people reach the age 
of retirement.  Lengthened life expectancies compound the financial crunch.  An increasing share 
of senior citizens will live two entire decades into retirement.16  The average life expectancy for 
Americans increased from 69.6 years in 1950, to 74.7 years in 1983.17  Thus, senior citizens 
                                                 
9 See David J. Allor, Re-Planning the Future: Community Life in Retirement, Planners Web, Planning 
Commissioners Journal 
10 Deborah A. Howe, Creating Vital Communities: Planning for Our Aging Society, Planners Web, Planning 
Commissioners Journal. 
11 Howe,… 
12 Allor, 
13 Howe, 
14 Allor 
15 Allor, 
16 Allor 
17 Howe, 
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clearly will find it increasingly burdensome to fund their own survival and other segments of 
society will have to shoulder the financial burden. 
 Disturbingly, seniors’ dire financial condition will envelope them into the economic 
stratification that suburban sprawl perpetuates.  America has embraced the idea of “moving 
up.”18  However, the absence of economically diverse neighborhoods within suburban 
communities inextricably intertwines “moving up” with “moving out” to separate communities.19  
“Among 554 well-established suburbs in the 24 most populous metropolitan areas, 405 suburbs 
had declined in median family income, as compared with the entire metropolitan area, from 1960 
to 1990.”20  Furthermore, “[b]etween 1980 and 1990, the number of suburbs whose family 
incomes were below 80 percent of the metropolitan median family income had increased 
fourfold, from 22 to 90,”21 indicating a dramatic polarization among suburban communities.  
Due to their dwindling limited financial capacity, the elderly will find themselves unable to 
upscale their lifestyle to new suburban communities and will be trapped within deteriorating 
older suburban communities. 
The most obvious source of support for the elderly in times of crisis is the immediate 
family.  Middle-aged persons are going to have to devote to their parents an increasing share of 
their daily time.  However, the suburban phenomenon has made time a scarce commodity.  
According to a study of sixty-eight U.S. metropolitan areas, drivers were stuck in traffic for 
approximately four and a half billion hours.22  In addition to commuting to and from work, 
driving to the grocery store, and maintaining their residences, the middle-aged also have a 
                                                 
18 See Duany, supra note , at 44. 
19 See id. 
20 William H. Lucy & David L. Phillips, Suburban Decline: The Next Urban Crisis, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, at 55, 56 (Fall 2000). 
21 Id. 
22 Oliver A. Pollard, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: can we get there from here?, 29 Fordham Urban 
Law Journal 1529, 1535 (2002). 
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responsibility to chauffeur their children. 23  Rarely are cities situated so as to place residential 
areas within walking distance of parks or even schools, and, consequently, parents must drive 
their children to any extracurricular activities.  This suburban arrangement sparked the advent of 
the “soccer mom.”  Yet, dual incomes are increasing becoming necessary to support a family, 
and especially since the term family is more commonly covering grandparents. 
Because we expend so much time and resources caring for those who are incapable of 
caring for themselves, society has an interest in keeping seniors independent for as long as 
possible.  This may explain why assisted living has recently become a major competitor to 
nursing homes.24  Assisted living facilities allow its residents to reside in the privacy of their own 
apartments but provide necessary services as their health deteriorates.25  These programs are 
attractive to senior citizens because they “offer physical protections along with personal privacy 
and independence.”26 Government is increasing attempting to accommodate such facilities 
because they function on little state money.27  Yet, a traditional urban framework would offer all 
such qualities along with providing the elderly the opportunity to live in a generation diverse 
community.  Yet, the current arrangement of our living environment has impeded the elderly 
from living independent lives.28   
B.  The Elderly and the Automobile 
A key component to independent living is the freedom of movement.  Senior citizens and 
all citizens alike must have the means to go to the grocery store, meet friends, go shopping, 
attend functions, or realize any other activity consistent with their daily life.  Ironically, a device 
                                                 
23 Most school children take the bus or are driven by their parents. 
24 John Buntin, Make Room for the Elderly, Governing, 41 December 2000. 
25 Buntin, 41 
26 Buntin, 41 
27 Buntin, 41, 42. 
28 Deborah A. Howe, Creating Vital Communities: Planning for Our Aging Society, Planners Web, Planning 
Commissioners Journal. 
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specifically made for movement, the automobile, has proven to be a severe restriction on 
movement.  The automobile itself is not to blame but America’s unyielding reliance on it for 
transportation.  The forces of low-density development and single-use zoning have made the 
automobile the only feasible means of transportation.29  Walking, bicycling, or using public 
transport to accomplish necessary daily tasks simply are not viable options under current norms 
of development.30  Thus, our current social framework excludes those who are unable to afford a 
car or are physically incapable of driving. 
 Our reliance on the automobile is demonstrably visible when a housing development is 
adjacent to a shopping center.  Frequently, local ordinances mandate developers to erect a wall 
between differently zoned properties.  A person living but fifty yards away from the shopping 
center must still utilize a car to navigate through the subdivision to a main artery, and then to the 
store’s parking lot.31  The walk from his parking space to the store entrance may be roughly 
equivalent to the walk from his home to the store had the developer not built the wall.   
 Perhaps nothing has been more influential in the car-dominated design of our landscape 
than the consistent employment of single-use zoning.  Single-use zoning is local ordinances that 
separate land uses from one another.32  Modern development consists of four major use 
designations: housing subdivisions, shopping centers (strip malls), office parks, and civic 
institutions.33  The only linkage between each separate designation is the endless miles of 
roadways.34  Because daily life activities encompass each use designation, citizens spend 
                                                 
29 Duany, 23 
30 Olver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There From Here?, Fordham 
Urban Law Journal, 1529 (2002). 
31 See Duany at 25. 
32 See Pollard, at 1534.  At one time zoning only separated incompatible uses such as a polluting factory from 
residential housing.  However, modern zoning separates everything from low and medium density housing to 
general offices from medical offices.  See Duany pg. 10 n.1. 
33 Duany, at 5-6. 
34 Duany, at 7. 
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exorbitant amounts of time driving in between places and developers must tailor each destination 
to accommodate large quantities of automobiles.35  The fact that highway driving accounted for 
over 2.6 trillion miles in 1998 is reflective of integral nature the automobile exerts upon our 
arrangement of living.36 
 B.  Elderly Efforts to Keeping Pace with the Automobile 
 Like all segments of American society, the elderly have everything riding on the 
automobile.  They need an automobile to purchase the necessities of daily life such as groceries, 
cleaning products, or hardware supplies.  In addition to necessities, the elderly need automobiles 
to maintain a social existence.  Gatherings such as bingo, church, or even gambling excursions 
have served to replace traditional notions of community.  The elderly simply are unable to walk 
to a town square or center plaza with the purpose of conversing and socializing with others in 
their locale due to the replacement of convening areas with parking lots.  My college Spanish 
professor summarized the American seniors’ condition best when he drew my classes attention 
to the large number of elderly frequenting Spanish city plazas and then inquiring why he never 
saw any seniors in his visits to the United States.  Still a better illustration of the automobile’s 
facilitation of the loss civic pride was an elderly woman who expressed delight in visiting to 
Walmart to see her friends.37  No longer do we use our malls and shopping centers solely as 
private buildings for commerce.  Instead, we use them as public gathering places that serve as 
woefully inadequate town squares to which only an automobile may reach. 
 Those elderly capable of driving or that at least have their driver’s licenses, still 
experience a greater share of isolation than their middle aged counterparts.  Inertia tends to limit 
                                                 
35 Duany at 7. 
36 Pollard, at 1535.   From this statistic, one could figure that Americans averaged over 7.2 billion miles per day, 
which is equivalent to making forty round trips to the sun. 
37 I think I heard this as an anecdote from professor Kline. 
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senior driving.  Hazardous road conditions generally deter seniors from driving.38  In addition, 
seniors are more inclined to drive during the daylight hours where they drive significantly less 
than younger drivers.39  Since retired seniors are driving less and, consequently, making less 
frequent visits to other use zones, one must deduce they are staying at home.  Although the term 
“home” may have pleasant connotations, the reality of a home may be more akin imprisonment.  
To escape their reality, home dwellers escape boredom by watching television at all hours of the 
day.40  The endless violence and crime reports shown on television perpetuate viewer perceptions 
that the outside world is harsh, dangerous, and an unpleasant place to spend time.  Thus, living in 
an isolated island home creates an environment where we all are enslaved to an externally 
imposed fantasy world, but to which seniors are especially susceptible due to their extended 
hours within the home.  
The elderly are keenly aware that they are a driver’s license away from “spend[ing] the 
rest of their days quarantined with their fellow nonviable members of society.”41  Yet, to stage 
off this life paralyzing event, many elderly do their best to conceal their physical limitations.42  
As a senior undergoes the aging process, his ability to operate a motor vehicle becomes more and 
more diminished.  Seniors experience a general waning in reflexes and coordination.43  Arthritis 
contributes to slower reaction times decreasing the ability to avoid accidents during 
emergencies.44  Decreased circulation to the brain, medications, or senior dimentia may lead to 
mental inattentiveness and loss of judgment.45  Glaucoma, cataracts and other eye conditions 
                                                 
38 Internet statistic cite 
39 Internet statistic cite 
40 Kunstler, 23. 
41 Duany, 123 
42 Duany, 123 
43 Internet statistic cite 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
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impair vision, especially the ability to see peripherally.46  Finally, the elderly commonly are hard 
of hearing which diminishes their ability to be aware of auditory warning signs such as sirens.47 
Due to their many physical limitations, senior citizen motorists pose a very real and direct 
threat to themselves and all motorists on the road.  The National Traffic Safety Administration 
found that, in 1996, the elderly comprised the highest driver fatality rates based on estimated 
annual travel.48  The fatality rate for drivers age eighty-five and up was nine times as high as the 
rate for ages twenty-five through sixty-nine years old.49  In 1997, the American elderly 
represented ten percent of all licensed motorists or 17.7 million.50  This was a two percent 
increase from 1987.51  As the baby boom generation reaches retirement, this trend will assuredly 
continue. 
SPURRING ELDERLY FRIENDLY DEVELOPMENT 
 The discussion up to this point clearly indicates that the feasibility of walking or using 
public transit is minimal due to our communities are being so diffuse.  The elderly are in 
desperate need of walkable cities, cities that provide public transportation and cities that do not 
segregate affordable housing from others.  To attain each one of these goals, America must halt 
the outward expansion of asphalt into rural lands and, instead, develop inward to create high-
density populations.  The second half of this paper will explain how American tax policy has 
been a key component in fueling suburban sprawl and diffuse development.  In addition, it will 
examine how a fundamentally different policy will curtail suburban sprawl and stimulate dense 
development. 
                                                 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 Internet statistic cite 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
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A.  The Current Property Tax System 
 Nearly all American cities utilize the property tax system.52  Essentially, this system taxes 
the buildings located on a specific parcel of land proportionately much greater than the tax on the 
land itself.53  A government official (tax assessor) values the buildings on the land and 
subsequently the government taxes in proportion to the building’s value.54  Hence, the more a 
landowner develops his land, the greater his tax liability will be.55  In conjunction with our 
current zoning laws,56 this form of taxation has had devastating effects upon our cities. 
1. The Social Costs of Speculation 
 
The most obvious effects of the property tax are its penalization of development and 
encouragement of speculation.57  The tax enables a landowner with a vacant lot to wait for the 
market value of their land to significantly increase before deciding to sell it to a party willing to 
develop.58  These landowners are the driving force behind much of the vacant land located within 
America’s downtown districts.59  Such land has potentially high utility due to its proximity to 
connective infrastructure, public services and public amenities.60  Yet, it serves as a parking lot 
because the landowner has no incentive to sell or develop due to the exceptionally low cost of 
keeping the land or “holding cost.”61  Thus, a vacant parcel of land downtown may have virtually 
no tax liability, even though the land’s market value might approach one million dollars.62                                    
                                                 
52 J. Anthony Coughlan, Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 261 
53 See Kunstler, supra note , 197. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
57 Kunstler, supra note , 198. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 199. 
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This phenomenon of owners having the capacity to “horde” land for years on end sets the 
stage for suburban sprawl.  The cumulative effect of speculation takes a significant amount of 
land off the market since speculators will not sell until their land value reaches a certain 
threshold.63  The scarcity of land available on the market creates a greater demand and artificially 
high market prices.64  Most of the remaining land supply is located in the periphery edges of 
development.  Hence, developers divert their attention to this region because purchasing large 
parcels of farmland is much easier than conglomerating individual lots within more developed 
areas.65   
2. Facilitation of Urban and Suburban Decay 
 
 Assuming a landowner does decide to develop his land, the property tax system provides 
incentive to build low quality structures and disincentive to maintain existing structures located 
on the land.  As stated previously, the higher the buildings quality, the more the building is worth 
and, consequently, the greater the tax liability.66  This policy gives an owner great incentive to 
build a structure that serves only its intended use and offers no aesthetic charm for the public 
realm.  If it never rained, proprietors might even attempt constructing their business out of 
cardboard boxes.  As if punishing owners for building durable well-constructed buildings was 
not sufficiently outrageous, our tax laws provide an affirmative incentive to let their structures 
decay.67  The tax code presents owners with the opportunity to deduct depreciation of their 
buildings from their income taxes.68  For these reasons, blighted buildings, lifeless strip malls 
and endless burger joints scar much of our American landscape.  
                                                 
63 See id. at 198. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 201. 
66 See id. at 197. 
67 See id. at 200. 
68 See id. at 198. 
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 The legitimization and systematic encouragement of building decay has perpetuated the 
syndrome of suburban stratification where the middle class moves up and out leaving the elderly 
and poor behind in isolation.69  A recent national study has indicated low-quality housing is the 
driving force behind suburban and urban decline rather than age of housing.70  The study 
concluded “suburban decline usually occurs where there are large numbers of small houses with 
little aesthetic charm, where the houses are located in inconvenient settings, where there are few 
public amenities, and where there are often are no alternatives to automobile transportation.”71  
Property taxation makes it impossible to break out of this cycle because it perpetuates cookie 
cutter housing developments on the metropolitan periphery.72  Moreover, it blocks structure 
reinvestment, which is an essential ingredient to suburban deterioration.73  The reality of a 
limited life span for viable suburban neighborhoods is so ingrained in the national psyche that 
homeowners are often advised not to improve the value of their property above twenty percent of 
neighboring housing values.74  The deteriorating character of the suburban neighborhood makes 
collecting on such an investment at resale doubtful.75  Thus, the property taxation system has 
created an economically stratified landscape where the upper classes continually retreat to newer 
development while the middle class neighborhoods that the elderly inhabit transform into 
blighted and neglected regions.  
 One may more easily appreciate the absolute dysfunction of property taxation by 
examining how it has spawned a breed of reprehensible social parasites known as slumlords. 
Contrary to popular belief, rent money is not the bread and butter of a slumlord.  Instead, 
                                                 
69 See supra notes 18-21, and accompanying text. 
70 See Lucy & Phillips supra note 20 at 57. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 58. 
73 See id. at 57 
74 See id. at 58. 
75 See id. 
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slumlords cash in when the city condemns their property and compensates the slumlord under the 
law of eminent domain.  The city must pay a premium price because he and other 
“hoarders/speculators” have created a state where land is artificially scarce and land market 
value reflects that scarcity.  Of course, the slumlord’s cost of holding the building before 
condemnation was minimal since its decrepit character dictated such a low property tax.  Hence, 
the slumlord is just a microcosm of the overall waste and deterioration that the property tax 
system fosters in our cities. 
B.  Givings 
 
 The jurisprudential failure of American law to recognize the concept of “givings” has 
compounded the inefficient governmental and private decision making that the property tax 
system breeds.  Givings are government actions that directly or indirectly confer benefits upon 
the private actor.76  The concept of givings is the twin behind the Iron Mask takings has 
overshadowed within the kingdom of constitutional law.  Proponents argue the same efficiency 
justifications and theories for which the constitutional drafters enacted the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment mandate a givings jurisprudence as well.77  The Takings Clause forces the 
state to account for the costs it inflicts upon displaced private parties when it exercises its power 
of eminent domain.78  This internalization of costs forces the state to act efficiently by limiting 
eminent domain proceedings to “when the aggregate benefit exceeds the aggregate cost.”79  In a 
similar manner, the givings doctrine requires government to internalize benefits so it may operate 
under fiscal reality, which will compel individuals to invest efficiently.80 
                                                 
76 See generally, Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 574 (2001). 
77 See id. at 553-554. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 553. 
80 See id. at 554, 581-82. 
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In the context of land-use, perhaps the best definition of givings is “any increase in the 
value of land … arising from central or local government action, whether positive, e.g., by the 
execution of the public works or improvements, or negative, e.g., by the imposition of the 
restrictions on other land.”81  This definition divides givings into three separate classifications, 
mirroring their takings counterpart.  When the state grants a property interest to a private party, it 
performs a giving in the most obvious form; a physical givings.  In Pole Town Neighborhood 
Council v. City of Detroit,82 the City of Detroit perfectly illustrated a physical giving, when it 
transferred to General Motors land it had acquired from eminent domain proceedings.83  The 
next category is regulatory givings where government regulation enhances the property value of 
private parties.84  Regulatory givings are most visible zoning contexts such as where the 
government “upzones”85 or grants a variance or exceptional use permit.86  Finally, derivative 
givings exist whenever the state provides a physical or regulatory giving that indirectly increases 
the value of surrounding private property.87  Landowners most notably receive derivative givings 
when the government installs nearby infrastructure, which increases the landowners’ property 
value.88 
When government fails to account for givings a condition of fiscal illusion exists and 
influences the government to undertake expensive projects and improvements that are 
                                                 
81 Windfalls For Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation, 112 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski 
eds. 1978). 
82 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) 
83 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 552, 568 (2001); see generally Pole 
Town Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, __, 457 (Mich. 1981). 
84 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 551, 563. 
85 Upzoning describes the situation where private property owners subject to a certain zoning ordinance benefit from 
its alteration.  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 550. 
86 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 564. 
87 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 551. 
88 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 564.  
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economically inefficient.89  When government bestows a benefit upon private land, the lands’ 
property taxes fall far short of “recapturing” the benefit landowners receive on account of 
government action.90  In effect, the rest of the population is forced to subsidize the landowners’ 
windfall.91  For instance, when the government installs a public works project, such as new park, 
it effectively is providing a derivative givings to land in close proximity to the development 
because it increases the land’s value and rental prices.92  The average worker or business owner 
will finance the project by paying taxes on labor (income tax), goods and capital (property tax).93  
However, the taxpayers’ payment liability will not be limited to just subsidizing the government 
project.  These same workers and business owners have the additional liability of paying higher 
rents and land prices to the very landowners whom were able to enjoy the increase in value due 
to the taxpayer’s subsidization.94  Hence, America’s current system is “double billing” workers 
and business owners. 95   Not only do they pay taxes that support the various government works 
projects, but they also pay landowners increased rent and sales prices for which their taxes 
financed.96 
                                                 
89 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra at 584. 
90  See Windfalls For Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation, 16 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. 
Misczynski eds. 1978)Property taxes commonly do not affect landowner’s out of pocket costs because they tend to 
divert them to renters in the form of higher prices.  See Windfalls For Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and 
Compensation, 112 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds. 1978); Kunstler supra note , at 200; see also 
Fred Folvary, The Synthesized Georgist-Libertarian Perspective on Markets and Planning, at 
http://www.foldvary.net/works/uk11.html (June 11, 2002). 
91 See Folvary supra note 76; see also Windfalls For Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation, 15 (Donald 
G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds. 1978) (defining “Windfall” as “any increase in the value of real estate--- 
other than that caused by the owner --- or by general inflation”). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id.  Under the property tax system, landowners find it easy to “shift” their tax liability to tenants by raising 
rents.  See Windfalls For Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation, 112 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. 
Misczynski eds. 1978). 
 95 Fred Foldvary, The Synthesized Georgist-Libertarian Perspective on Markets and Planning, at 
http://www.foldvary.net/works/uk11.html (June 11, 2002). 
96 See id. 
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In tandem with refusing to acknowledge derivative givings, government’s failure to 
account for regulatory givings amplifies inefficient behavior.  Zoning regulations restrict the 
nature of development on specific parcels of land. Essentially, government arbitrarily limits 
development through zoning.97  This creates an artificial reduction in the supply of land.98 In a 
fashion similar the “hording” effect perpetuated by speculators,99 the resulting decrease of land 
supply raises land rents and values.100 This gives private landowners the incentive to pressure 
government to exclude new entrants through zoning, which is known as “rent-seeking.”101  
Consequently, zoning paralyzes the supply-side of land, and landowners use the land shortage to 
exploit its tenants.   
 Some may inquire why the common worker or business owner would sit idly when the 
present state of affairs redistributes wealth from their classes to landowners.  The answer lies in 
the nature of our political processes.  To gain a basis of understanding one must be familiar with 
these three relevant characteristics of the political process: (1) government officials seek to 
maximize their likelihood of maintaining power; (2) the collective action problem hampers the 
organization and political influence of large groups with diffuse interests; and (3) tight knit 
interest groups exert disproportionate political pressure “by offering [officials] campaign 
contributions, blocks of votes, selective information … in exchange for favorable government 
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policy.”102  These three factors create an environment where small factions may easily exploit 
larger factions.103   
Landowners owners are particularly apt to manipulate the political process.  They, of 
course, wish to maintain their rent-seeking capabilities as well as deflecting the costs of givings 
on the government and its taxpaying constituents.  As a group with concentrated interests and 
vast wealth reserves, they are able to effectively lobby government to preserve this system.  
Faced with a solid voting block and potential campaign contributions, officials appease 
landowners to maximize their political benefits with minimal fallout.104  The advantage of such a 
course of action is that officials are able to hide the economic costs of windfalls by redistributing 
them to the public at large or “politically expendable beneficiaries of other government 
programs.”105  Rarely will the taxpaying public revolt against government givings because they 
are such a small fraction of individual voter’s tax liablity.106  In addition, the general public has 
no access to information detailing the redistribution of wealth, due to the tendency of officials to 
inflate social benefits while dismissing social costs.107  Consequently, government, at the behest 
of a landowning minority, continues to indulge in inefficient land-use practices.   
C.  The Solution: Land Value Tax System 
 
 
                                                
Perhaps no method so singularly cures the defects of the property tax system while 
synthesizing givings concepts than the land value tax system.  An early American social 
reformer, named Henry George (1839-1897), developed the idea of a land tax system primarily 
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as a means to depolarize the large wealth disparities that existed during his time.108  George 
witnessed land barons reap exorbitant amounts of wealth from the increase of socially created 
land value.109  He recognized that taxpayer money funded the unparalleled growth that 
contemporary industrial cities experienced and, in turn, financed the increase of socially created 
value.110  George contended the land value tax raised revenue by tapping into or “recapturing” 
this unearned increment of wealth.111   He also argued that such as tax was a much more 
desirable alternative to other forms of taxes such as excise, sales, and income taxes, which 
penalized productive activity and tended to “erode its base.”112  For instance, sales taxes 
discourage consumers from buying goods and a decrease in sales results in lower tax revenue or, 
more pertinently, a tax on buildings serves as a disincentive to construct, improve or preserve 
structures and lower development leads to diminished property tax returns.113  Essentially, 
George opined landowners had no entitlement to unearned value that the community had 
generated through public and private activity.114 
 Unlike the productivity taxes’ distorted effects upon economic decision-making,115 land 
value taxation promotes the most efficient use of land or “the highest and best use from an 
economic point of view.”116  Standard economic theory identifies taxes as not only burdening the 
economy by extracting money for the state but also imposing an additional “deadweight loss” 
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upon the economy.117  Simply put, taxation raises costs and decreases output and investment, 
which prevents actors from allocating resources to their most valued uses.118  However, 
deadweight loss is diminutive if the taxed resource is inelastic, meaning its quantity does not 
decrease substantially at a higher price.119  Land supply is virtually inelastic.120  Except for a few 
inconsequential examples, such as draining swamps or using dikes to replace water with soil, we 
are unable to expand or contract land.121  Consequently, the fixed nature of land allows 
government to use land tax for public revenue without the deadweight loss from the 
misallocation of land uses.122  
1. Land Value Taxation Incorporation of Givings Equity Principles 
 
 The principles underlying the concept of givings supports the very foundation of the land 
value tax system.  The idea behind the tax is it “captures” the value that government generates 
through explicit investment (givings).123  It should also capture the enhanced value of land that 
the synergies of private activities generate.124  The value derived from locating in a thriving 
community is described as “socially created value.”125  One need not delve into abstract theories 
of justice to conclude that the state’s supply of funds entitles it to enjoy the benefits its 
investment produces.  Fairness dictates that society as a whole as receive the return on its 
investments rather than individuals whom rarely may be attributed with an increase in land 
value.126  Although its entitlement to socially created value may not be as plain, it nonetheless 
should benefit from socially created value as well.  The reason being that government offers 
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more than physical investment.  The existence of civilization depends upon its government to 
offer security and order.  Hence, the private parties should not benefit from unearned profits that 
government makes possible through its management of a civilization. 
 2.  Land Value Taxation Incorporation of Efficiency Givings Principles 
 Aside from an equity perspective, efficiency principles support land value taxation.  Such 
a system will prove to be a formidable obstacle to speculation while fostering high-quality 
development.  In addition, land value taxation will halt the unsustainable low-density 
devlopment known as suburban sprawl. 
i.  The End of Speculation 
 
When government taxes land by location rather than by the land’s development, private 
parties will find speculation to be a very expensive pursuit.  Under the land value taxation 
system, land location is the only factor affecting tax liability not the nature of the development 
on the land.127  Whether the land contains a high-rise building or a vacant lot has no affect its tax 
liability.  As land location becomes more and more proximate to governmental improvements 
and areas of high socially created value, tax liability will increase.  Prime real estate, usually 
centrally located, consequently will have high “holding costs.”128  This will pressure landowners 
in possession of such real estate to either develop their land to a point where the return on the 
land is greater than its tax liability or sell the land to a person with the ambition and imagination 
to make his ownership profitable.129  Whatever the decision, someone will put the land to its best 
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use, which would usually be “profitable and socially beneficial” development.130  Hence, the 
land value taxation system actively encourages dense development by filling in vacant space. 
Opponents argue that land value taxation not only encourages high-density development but 
fuels over-development, leading to over-congestion.131  The contend that open space, theatre 
districts, hotel districts, shopping areas and other social amenities will be unable to locate in 
central areas due to the higher tax liability.132   The flaw in this theory is it fails to account for the 
increased supply of land that the land value tax system releases onto the market.133  This increase 
in supply significantly lowers demand.134  Reduced demand dictates a low purchase price on 
centrally located parcels.135  In addition, land sellers capitalize the land value tax into the price of 
the land.136  Purchasing centrally located property would entail a low entrance fee but a high 
“holding cost.”137  While the low initial purchase price of land parcels allows landowners to 
purchase land for reasonable prices, the high holding costs encourage development.  Yet the 
dilution of demand would mitigate over-development.138   
In contrast, the property tax system actually encourages hyper-development.  As previously 
described, hoarding contributes to short supply and excessive pricing of land.  Landowners that 
purchase a parcel of land only can justify such an exorbitant purchase if they build skyward.139  
For this reason, one finds in American downtowns skyscrapers adjacent to parking lots.  A more 
continuous unimposing skyline would flourish under the land tax system.   
  ii. The End of Low-Quality Structures 
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 The land value taxation system’s exemption of buildings would prove extremely 
beneficial to the quality of new and existing structures.140  No longer would landowners attempt 
to minimize the value assessment of their buildings to mitigate their tax liability under the 
property tax system.  Instead, they would have incentive to build durable structures that best 
serve their intended purpose.  Durability increases the value of the landowner’s specific property 
and alleviates potential costs of repair or redevelopment.  The landowner’s desire to spend as 
little as possible on upkeep and repair, will lead him to continuously reinvest in his buildings. 
 The combination of high-density and high quality construction is a giant step toward de-
stratifying socio-economic classes and maintaining decent communities.  Isolated housing tracts 
with little architectural integrity, which offer the optimal conditions for suburban and urban 
blight, will no longer be feasible.141  The land valuation tax would redefine the character of 
middle class housing to small housing plots near public amenities.  On account of its dense 
nature, such housing becomes much more accessible.  Accessibility is conducive to the 
incorporation of public transportation.  Furthermore, property owners will have incentive to 
reinvest in their property to increase its value, which is a key component to maintaining the 
viability of a thriving neighborhood. 
 The construction of high quality middle class homes and the reinvestment in those homes 
are the seeds to future affordable housing.  Community evolution generally experiences a process 
where lower economic classes inhabit aged middle class housing.142  Although the structures 
may be less desirable, the combination of high-quality construction and reinvestment prevents 
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such housing from undergoing excessive decay.143  This process is in stark contrast to the present 
cycles where the poor inhabit formerly middle class housing that have served their short life span 
and are now decrepit and lifeless.144 
An increase in development and the elimination of the incentive to construct low quality 
structures will also generate an increase in affordable housing.  As apartments occupy formerly 
vacant land, the supply of rental units will increase.145  Landlords will enter into fierce 
competition to attract tenants.146  Consequently, they will have an incentive to lower rents while 
raising rental housing quality.147   
iii.  The End of Fringe Development 
 
 Land value taxation will dispel the fiscal illusion that has cloaked sprawl’s inefficiency. 
The government will assess the value of private land as a function of the governmental amenities 
and improvements that surround it.  This relieves the public from shouldering the entire financial 
burden of expanding the city’s infrastructure for the benefit of a select few landowners.  Instead, 
assessment of land tax liability would reflect all such governmental givings.  As such, voters 
who own land on the outward fringe will have a tendency to reject governmental improvements 
or projects that would increase their land tax liability. 
The land tax’s elimination of two key windfalls that landowners receive under the 
property tax system may be of even greater salience for curtailing fringe development.  First, 
landowners would no longer reap unearned government givings because the land tax liability 
would reflect the value of such givings.  Second, tenants would no longer pay artificially high 
rental and purchase prices to landowners since an increase of land supply on the market would 
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drive down any such prices.  The absence of these two factors significantly diminishes any 
incentive landowners may have to push for adjacent governmental investment or to exhibit rent-
seeking behavior.  The concentrated group of landowners that so effectively used their wealth to 
manipulate the political process would loose the interests that bonded them.  Thus, land value 
taxation will signify the extinction of a powerful landowning interest group pressuring 
government to fund sprawl development. 
A misguided fear is that the land tax will accelerate fringe development.  Opponents 
recognize fringe activity, such as farming, is typically land intensive and argue the land tax is 
especially burdensome because land is the tax’s entire base.  Yet, this argument fails to consider 
that land value tax liability is less a product of land quantity than land location.  Government 
would minimally tax land in the hinterlands because they experience little governmental givings.  
In point of fact, cities account for ninety percent of land values.148  No longer would farmers be 
able to enjoy increasing land value due to unaccounted governmental givings and to then “cash 
out” by selling to developers.149 
4. The End of Zoning 
The irony should not be lost upon anyone that a civilization whose faithful commitment 
to the free market system won over rival command economies has imposed a system in which 
government centrally plans the design and makeup of its cities through zoning regulation.  
Zoning regulation is the anti-thesis to the free market because it arbitrarily limits development.  
Economists agree zoning serves as a substitute for taxation because, like taxation, it imposes 
costs.150  Zoning is a “taxation in substance if not form” on development.151  Development is an 
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elastic resource because “its quantity decreases substantially if its price is higher.”152  
Consequently, zoning produces an enormous “deadweight loss” since it “taxes” an elastic 
resource.153 
The social ills to which zoning laws were a rational reaction would not present the same 
issues under a land value tax system.  In contrast to European cities, which underwent centuries 
of evolution, American cities, in the matter of a century, went from wilderness outposts to 
metropolises with populations in the millions.154  Industrialism dominated the city landscape and 
turned city life into a noisy, filthy “hell on earth.”155  America used zoning as a way to separate 
industry’s horrible externalities from housing.156  Yet, the land tax would separate industry from 
residential or mixed use areas out of efficiency mechanisms.  Simply put, industrial complexes 
and plants that use a considerable amount of land would find locating in a central prime real 
estate to be economically impracticable.  Such industries could only justify locating in areas 
where their needs for minimal infrastructure are met.  Moreover, new technology has diminished 
the uncleanliness and general unpleasantness of many types of industrial plants.  Thus, zoning 
has outlived its necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In tandem with current zoning laws, the property tax system’s encouragement of 
speculation and decay has spawned a condition where the citizenry is increasing disconnected 
from each other and a sense of place.  The elderly are particularly susceptible to the ills of sprawl 
development.  Their increasing inability to drive has made home living nearly impossible and 
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has strained other members of society attempting to aid the elderly in survival.  Moreover, the 
elderly’s increased numbers will significantly diminish their financial reserves, increasing their 
inability to move up and out with the rest of their community.  Consequently, they are stratified 
into a low socio-economic class which is forced to live in communities that are past their shelf 
life. 
 Land value taxation may be the first block toward building senior friendly environments.  
Its incorporation of givings principles pressures communities to centralize and use land 
efficiency.  Under the land tax, a grocery store need not be a drive away but may be right below 
a senior citizens low rent apartment.  Furthermore, dense developments facilitates the installation 
of public transportation which will allow the elderly to divert their depleted funds to more useful 
resources such as health insurance or mortgage payments.  Thus, a land tax will be of primary 
importance to increasing the independence of the elderly and instilling an overall civic pride. 
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